

Ministry of National Security

MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF VEHICLES IN THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO POLICE SERVICE

A SPECIAL REPORT BY THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO



Auditor General's Department of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
March 2010

**Special Audit of the
Management and Maintenance of Vehicles
in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service**

**THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED UNDER
SECTION 116 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND
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THE EXCHEQUER AND AUDIT ACT
CHAPTER 69:01**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the years there have been numerous complaints against the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (the Police Service) regarding their service delivery. The lack of functioning vehicles has been cited as a contributory factor to this situation. The Police Service is in the midst of a transformation process to address the issue of its effectiveness and to improve customer satisfaction. During the period 2006 to 2008, \$86 million was spent on the acquisition of vehicles. Despite this government investment, the Police Service continues to be hampered by a lack of mobility which manifests itself in public complaints about the Police Service's inability to respond in a timely manner. Our audit was conducted to assess the extent to which the Police Service properly managed and maintained its vehicles.

2. The management and maintenance function is controlled by the Transport and Telecommunication Branch (the Transport Branch) of the Police Service and is a coordinated effort facilitated through its three main repair centres (Motor Pools) strategically located in Port of Spain, San Fernando and Tobago. In 2000 July the Government designated The Vehicle Management Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago Limited (VMCOTT) as the repair and maintenance provider for the Police Service. Prior to the commencement of operations of VMCOTT in 2001 October the Transport Branch was responsible for the provision of repair and maintenance services at the three repair centres. Since this date however the Motor Pools have not performed major maintenance work.

Strategies to ensure the availability of vehicles should be reviewed

3. A key problem with the management and maintenance of police vehicles has been the absence of strategic planning and policy direction at all levels in the fleet management process. This important area has been given low priority by the Police Service resulting in the failure to achieve value for money.

4. The Government has responded to the problem of vehicle maintenance in the Police Service through the appointment of VMCOTT as its main repair and maintenance provider. In 2004, the Government considered engaging VMCOTT as the Fleet Manager for police vehicles but at the time of our audit in 2009 there was no evidence that this arrangement was finalized. There is no contract agreement between the Police Service and VMCOTT and adequate mechanisms to manage the partnership arrangement have not been put in place. In light of this the effectiveness of the service arrangement has not been achieved. The Police Service has failed to partner successfully with VMCOTT.

5. As part of the transformation process the 'Model Station' concept was introduced which recommended an optimum resource allocation of 100 officers and ten vehicles for each 'Model Station.' Some officers complained that in order to implement this strategy, valuable resources were moved from existing stations to fully equip each 'Model Station.' We did not see an

assessment of the effect of the depletion of resources in other stations nor did we see an assessment of the effectiveness of the 'Model Stations' with respect to the number of vehicles assigned. It is not clear whether the impact of these changes was assessed at the strategic planning level.

6. With the selection of VMCOTT as the vehicle maintenance and repair provider, several staff at the Transport Branch were redeployed. Maintenance workers were sent to various Divisions of the Police Service to perform the function of a Vehicle Maintenance Officer (VMO). These officers are required to perform daily checks on all police vehicles and are responsible for monitoring and coordinating vehicle repair and service activities to ensure that the vehicles are functioning effectively and are being serviced in a timely manner. However, lack of proper planning and inconsistent allocation has resulted in an inadequate number of VMO's to carry out this service effectively. For example, in the Southern Division one VMO is responsible for 52 vehicles at ten stations and two police posts.

A Comprehensive Policy on Fleet Management does not exist

7. The Police Service did not have a comprehensive policy in place which governed all aspects of their fleet management functions. Instead we saw that procedures and guidelines were issued in the form of Standing Orders by the Commissioner of Police which gave some instructions concerning the use of vehicles, such as Standing Order 49 "Care and Maintenance of Police Vehicles."

8. One of the functions of the Transport Branch, as stated in Standing Order 49, is the formulation of policies for the efficient management and control of the vehicle repair centres. However, we found that there were no documented guidelines issued to the Motor Pools governing their activities. This resulted in part, in an inconsistent approach in the maintenance of records at the Motor Pools visited.

9. Police Service vehicle acquisition was particularly affected by the lack of detailed policy guidelines. During the years 2000 to 2008 there were many changes in persons assigned to manage the vehicle fleet. This coupled with the lack of policy has resulted in a wide variety of vehicles being purchased for use by the Police Service. Not all vehicle types have been appropriate and suitable to the needs of the Police given their unique requirements. Analysis of Police Service needs with respect to types and quantities of vehicles is not done. As a result, at the time of our review there were at least 24 different types of vehicles in the Police Service's fleet.

10. The service provider VMCOTT complained that it has difficulty stocking and accessing parts for such a wide variety of vehicles. In addition the Transport Branch continued to make large purchases of parts, materials and vehicle supplies even though it conducted minimal repair work. The reasoning and justification for this was not clear.

11. Purchases during the period 2006 to 2008 were as follows:

Year	Vehicles Acquired	Cost (\$M)
2006	178	25
2007	99	16
2008	220	45

In the absence of a proper needs analysis, explanations and/or rationale and/or value for money considerations for the cost and quantity of vehicles purchased were lacking.

12. We found that vehicle maintenance costs averaged \$26.5 million per year over the period 2006 to 2008. Despite this investment, approximately half of the vehicle fleet was found to be non-operational during this period. In addition during 2006 purchase arrangements with various suppliers included prepayments for maintenance service. However, due to the inability of the Police Service to properly co-ordinate its fleet function, vehicles were not sent for service at the allotted time resulting in financial loss.

13. The Police Service also leased and rented vehicles at the following costs: \$5 million in 2006, \$8 million in 2007 and \$9 million in 2008, for an average of 65 vehicles per month. The key driver was to obtain vehicles to enable covert and undercover operations. Due to the nature of these operations, the Police Service did not make available the information necessary to determine the full scope of rentals in this area. There were no formalized and documented policies and systems in place to manage vehicle rentals. In the absence of guidelines for contract negotiation and selection of suppliers, the Police Service failed to negotiate beneficial terms and conditions of agreement for vehicle rentals.

14. There was also no Police Service policy on the appropriate time to dispose of vehicles. This appeared to be done on an 'ad hoc' basis and was dependent on the complete breakdown or non-functioning of vehicles. We found instances of costly repairs undertaken on vehicles that may not represent value for money. For example, a six year old van was repaired at a cost of \$60,711. There was no evidence that an assessment was considered or done to determine whether disposal of this asset would have been more beneficial.

15. We found that there was a lack of enforcement of the requirements of the various Standing Orders regarding vehicle care and maintenance. Police officers are aware of the requirements and said that there is compliance. However, we did not see evidence that the required daily, weekly and monthly checks on vehicles were performed in strict accordance with the Standing Order guidelines.

16. In light of VMCOTT providing repair and maintenance services, the role of the 'Motor Pools' has not been rationalized so that they can be provided with adequate guidance and support for their revised role.

Fleet Records were not properly maintained

17. Insufficient priority has been given to administering the filing, storage and analysis of information relating to police vehicles. Filing systems were poorly maintained and not properly secured. As a result, 29 percent of the files requested for our review could not be located. Current and recent information relating to vehicles was stored in boxes awaiting filing. As a result, essential management information needed to make informed decisions on matters relating to the acquisition, maintenance and disposal of vehicles was unavailable. For example, information showing lifetime repair and maintenance costs for each vehicle was not readily available. In addition, information on the numbers and location of vehicles at specific times was not reliable due to omissions and inaccuracies on the Police Service database.

18. The Police Service purchased fleet management IT software in 2007 but failed to make use of its capability to provide appropriate and relevant information for the management of the vehicle fleet. The Police Service record-keeping difficulties are highlighted by an amount of \$18 million that VMCOTT has claimed for services rendered during the eight-year period 2001 to 2008. The Police Service disputes this figure, but due to the incompleteness of its own records, has been unable to reconcile this amount. In addition, Police Service complaints about lengthy delays and the quality of service provided by VMCOTT are not evidenced because the Police Service is unable to provide adequate records showing the dates vehicles were sent for repairs, the type of repairs and the cost of parts. The Police Service cannot provide reports that reflect actual costs incurred and is unable to determine if the actual costs incurred are reasonable.

19. Information systems are not functioning as a result of poor record-keeping and this has hindered the ability of the Police Service to manage their service with regard to vehicles and also their relationship with VMCOTT. Improper record-keeping does not facilitate timely follow-up and as a result the Police Service has not made payments for services in a timely manner with examples of periods between receipt of invoices and payment thereof ranging between 13 months to five years. This has had an adverse effect on their reputation and ability to negotiate effectively with suppliers.

Conclusion

20. The review of the management and maintenance of police service vehicles shows that management needs to make some strategic decisions on the future of fleet management in the Police Service. The decision must consider whether the Police Service will be responsible for full fleet management or for specific areas. The Standing Orders on which the Police Service relies for guidance are clear but do not address full fleet management. The strategies in place for purchasing, leasing, disposal and maintenance/repair of vehicles are not adequate.

Recommendations

21. Management should establish a comprehensive and effective fleet management system without delay. The system should include adequate policies and procedures for acquisition, replacement, use, maintenance, repair and disposal of vehicles. The system should include monitoring at all levels especially by Heads of Divisions and Officers in Charge of Stations to ensure proper compliance with the policies and procedures. Documented strategies would enable understanding by all users and continuity by current and subsequent managers.
22. The Standing Orders on which the Police Service relies for guidance with respect to fleet management should be updated.
23. The Police Service should ensure that in determining its vehicle needs, in terms of type and quantity of vehicles, the input of Divisional Heads as well as users at each Station and Unit is considered.
24. The Police Service should put in place a coherent policy that evaluates the cost and service delivery benefits derived from leasing and renting vehicles on a continuous long-term basis as against purchasing vehicles. The arrangements with suppliers should bring cost-benefit to the Police Service. They should negotiate rates to achieve favourable terms.
25. The Police Service should ensure that the vehicle fleet policy provides specific guidance on the disposal of vehicles. The policy should give priority to the value for money of all repairs, whether due to age or vehicle failure/damage. Records showing basic information on the historic life, repair and maintenance of vehicles should be maintained in order to allow analysis of the costs associated with depreciation and wear and tear of vehicles and facilitate informed disposal decisions.
26. The Fleet Manager should place urgent and immediate emphasis on the maintenance of records which track each vehicle's life cycle, a fundamental asset management requirement.
27. The paper-based (file) system should be reviewed and if found to be inefficient, urgent consideration should be given to addressing the deficiencies by using a networked computerized fleet management system.
28. The Police Service should ensure that the strategy must consider all operating costs and any additional cost to the State when the vehicle is not available for use. While there may be no one standard maintenance guide that will cover all vehicles, preventive maintenance should be developed as it is key to avoiding repair or replacement of costly vehicle components.

29. There should be greater communication between the Transport Branch of the Police Service and the Project Management Unit of the Ministry of National Security with respect to the acquisition of vehicles for the Police Service.

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service is an arm of the Ministry of National Security and is responsible for the security of citizens and visitors to Trinidad and Tobago. Its job includes providing a visible service to evoke a sense of safety and security that reassures the public. The Police Service is currently in the midst of a transformation process which is aimed at being more proactive rather than reactive in addressing citizens' concerns. This transformation involves the police having high visibility, accessibility and increased mobility to ensure 'Policing for the people approach'. As a result, the public's expectation is that their demands will be met with a timely response by the Police. In addition to well-trained police officers, an adequate number of vehicles are important for an effective response as the reputation of the Police Service will be damaged when public expectations are not met.

RATIONALE

1.2 The Auditor General has noted recurring public complaints that the Police Service does not respond in a timely manner reportedly due to a lack of vehicles. As mobility is one of the key areas that affects the ability of the Police Service to respond effectively, a special audit was conducted to assess the extent to which the Police Service managed and maintained its vehicles.

BACKGROUND

1.3 The Ministry of National Security (the Ministry) is the 'Parent Ministry' for the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. The Police Service was established under Section 4(1) of the Police Service Act and has as its motto: - *'To protect and serve with pride'*. The Vision of the Police Service is *'To be the national provider of professional policing services'* and its Mission is *'To provide safety, security, and stability for the Nation by upholding the laws firmly and fairly, while ensuring prompt, courteous and professional service in partnership with the community'*. The Police Service is headed by the Commissioner of Police. Three Deputy Commissioners of Police report to the Commissioner of Police. These Deputy Commissioners are responsible for Strategic Planning and Development, Crime and Operations and Criminal Intelligence respectively. There are ten Assistant Commissioners of Police who supervise four regions, in addition to other areas such as Community Relations, Mobile, Criminal Intelligence and Investigation, Homicide, Special Branch and Anti-corruption and who report to the Deputy Commissioners. (See **Figure 1**.)


1.4 The Police Service is divided into four regions: North-West, South, North-East and Tobago. These regions are further divided into nine Divisions namely Western, North Eastern, Port of Spain, Northern, Central, Eastern, Southern, South Western and Tobago. Within these Divisions there are 70 police stations and police posts (See **Figure 2**). These are dispersed throughout the country to provide policing services to the various towns and districts across Trinidad and Tobago.

1.5 The Police Service recognizes that mobility is fundamental to:

- ensuring the effective delivery of policing services;
- providing them with the ability to respond to calls within the shortest time possible, and
- providing a high level of visibility.


Consequently, the Transport and Telecommunications Branch of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service has the critical task of providing all Divisions, Branches, Sections and Units with vehicles which are functioning effectively and ensuring fleet maintenance.

Figure 1. Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Organization



Source: The Commissioner’s 2007 July to December (Semi-Annual) Report

Figure 2 The Police Service's Nine Regional Divisions and respective stations



1.6 Within the Police Service there are also Squads and Units which provide specialized services to assist in meeting performance targets. (Figure 3 refers.) The 2008 key performance targets were as follows:

- Crime reduction – to reduce serious crimes by 10 per cent, Homicides by 20 per cent and Gang-related and Drug-related Homicides by 15 per cent;
- Improve detection rate – serious crimes by 10 per cent and Homicides by 10 per cent;
- Reduce road traffic accidents by 12 per cent;
- Complete construction of two police stations and commence construction of 19 police stations;
- Increase the number of complaints against police officers processed by 10 per cent;

- Establish a Public Affairs Unit in the Police Service;
- Complete the implementation of the new performance appraisal system, and
- Engage the services of skilled civilian managers in eight specific key areas.

Figure 3 Divisions, Squads and Units of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Community Police</u> • <u>Police Training College</u> • <u>Police Complaints Division</u> • <u>Police Band</u> • <u>Transit Police Unit</u> • <u>Transport and Telecom Branch</u> • <u>Mounted and Canine Branch</u> • <u>E-999 Command Communications</u> • <u>Traffic and Highway Patrol Branch</u> • <u>Criminal Intelligence and Investigation Division</u> • <u>Criminal Records Office</u> • <u>Court and Process</u> • <u>Fraud Squad</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Organized Crime, Narcotic and Firearms Bureau</u> • <u>Guard and Emergency Branch</u> • <u>Homicide Bureau</u> • <u>Special Branch</u> • <u>Anti-Corruption and Investigations Bureau</u> • <u>Special Anti-crime Unit of Trinidad and Tobago(SAUTT)</u> • <u>Anti – Kidnapping Unit</u> • <u>Inter Agency Task Force</u> • <u>Crime and Problem Analysis (CAPA) Unit</u> • <u>Special Evidence Recovery Unit</u> • <u>Repeat Offenders Task Force</u>

1.7 The Police Service has official procedures and guidelines to enable the management and maintenance of its vehicle fleet. These are in the form of Standing Orders, Departmental Orders, Divisional and Branch Orders, Operational Orders, Circulars, Notices and Station Orders. Standing and Departmental Orders are general instructions issued by the Commissioner of Police and are expected to be known and understood by all officers. They are kept at all stations for reference. Divisional, Branch and other Operational Orders are usually approved by senior officials and passed on to officers in charge of Divisions for issue to the lower-ranked officers. The following are the specific Standing Orders which provide for areas relevant to the management and maintenance of police vehicles:

- Standing Order 13 - Inspection and Visits
- Standing Order 49 - Care and Maintenance of Police Vehicles.

1.8 The Transport Branch is directly responsible for the management and maintenance of the police vehicle fleet. The Head Office of the Transport Branch is located at the Police Barracks, St James, Trinidad. Two sub-offices are located in San Fernando and Tobago respectively.

1.9 The Transport Branch coordinates the repair and maintenance services for the entire police vehicle fleet. Other responsibilities of the Transport Branch include:

- Managing the Driving Wing and Driving School
- Ensuring that repair centres are adequately staffed and personnel are adequately trained
- Providing minor repair and maintenance services in “Motor Pools” at the three Transport Branch locations
- Monitoring the scheduled maintenance of all vehicles
- Ensuring that all vehicles are insured
- Maintaining records for all vehicles
- Operating the fuel depots and the Stores depot.

1.10 The Police Service through the three Motor Pools has divided the maintenance service into four operational areas:

- Minor vehicle repairs
- Coordination of periodic servicing and inspection of vehicles with the suppliers for vehicles still under warranty
- Coordination of repairs with The Vehicle Management Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago Limited (VMCOTT)
- Maintaining files on all vehicles and records of vehicle repairs.

1.11 In addition to the minor vehicle repairs provided at the three Motor Pools, VMCOTT is the main provider of major repair and maintenance services for police vehicles.

1.12 VMCOTT is a wholly owned State enterprise under the purview of the Minister of Works and Transport. It was incorporated in 2000 August for the purpose of providing vehicle repair and maintenance services for four agencies under the Ministry of National Security. From the commencement of operations by VMCOTT in 2001 October to the present time, the Police Service is the only national security agency which continues to be provided with vehicle repair and maintenance services by VMCOTT. (See **Figure 4.**)

Figure 4 Police Vehicles awaiting repairs at VMCOTT's South Branch



1.13 The police vehicle fleet has increased over the last three years by the purchase of 497 vehicles at a cost of \$86 million (See **Figure 5**). Based on our review, we found that the police vehicle fleet comprised 1,058 vehicles of varying types such as trucks (Dump and Cargo), wreckers, buses, mobile stations, pick-ups, sport utility vehicles (SUVs), cars, motorcycles, tractors and a pirogue.

Figure 5 Police Service Vehicle Purchases		
Year	Cost (TT\$M)	No. of Vehicles Purchased
2006	25	178
2007	16	99
2008	45	220
Total	86	497

1.14 Over the same three-year period the Police Service sold 205 vehicles by public auction which brought in revenue of \$3,112,000. All receipts, after deduction of commission, were deposited in the Treasury as Government revenue.

1.15 We found the cost of repairs and maintenance of the Police Service vehicle fleet totalled \$80 million over the period 2006 – 2008. The repair and maintenance costs are broadly similar to the \$86 million utilized to purchase Police Service vehicles over the same period. (See **Figure 6**.)

Figure 6 The average annual cost of Police Service vehicles over the last three years				
Description	2006 TT\$M	2007 TT\$M	2008 TT\$M	Total TT\$M
Purchase	25	16	45	86
Lease /Rent	5	8	9	22
Repairs and Maintenance	28	25	27	80
Total	58	49	81	188
Average Annual Cost	-	-	-	62

1.16 In addition to those purchased, vehicles were also leased and rented at a cost of \$22.15 million over the three-year period 2006-2008. (Figure 7 refers.)

Figure 7 Cost of leasing and renting vehicles	
Year	Cost (TT\$M)
2006	5.07
2007	8.12
2008	8.96
Total	22.15

1.17 The average annual cost of managing and maintaining the police vehicles over the last three years was approximately \$62 million. (See Figure 6 above.)

1.18 The Police Service has an Administrative Unit within which is an Accounting Unit. The Accounting Unit makes payments for vehicle purchases, lease, rental, maintenance and repairs from the Recurrent Expenditure allocation. In addition, the Ministry of National Security receives funding under Development Programme for infrastructure works for seven security agencies under its purview. The Development Programme Expenditure is under the control of the Ministry's Project Management Unit and includes sums for purchase of vehicles for the Police Service. The Project Management Unit maintains the records for this expenditure.

PART TWO

MANAGEMENT POLICY DID NOT ADDRESS ALL ASPECTS OF VEHICLE FLEET MANAGEMENT

Police Service guidelines though incomplete are clear and detailed.

2.1 Standing Orders of the Police Service which address vehicle management and maintenance are as follows:

- Standing Order 13 which provides guidance for inspection and visits, and
- Standing Order 49 which provides instructions for the care and maintenance of police vehicles.

2.2 Standing Order 13:11 and 13:12 specify the levels of senior officials and the frequency of their visits to stations to examine and initial principal registers and ensure that the contents are accurate. There was no evidence in the vehicle files of checks done by senior officials with respect to maintenance of vehicle files and vehicle log books.

2.3 We found that the records at stations relevant to the management and maintenance of vehicles were limited to the Station Diary, the Patrol Registers and vehicle files. We also found that at all stations visited information was recorded in the Station Diary concerning the dates and the vehicles inspected. We noted that the Station Diary information was a summary and did not reflect the full particulars of the vehicles checked in keeping with the details required by Standing Order 49. Due to the lack of documentary evidence to assess the actual vehicle checks performed by officers it was clear that the guidelines, though understood, were not being properly followed. The situation is exacerbated by the Police Service's use of a paper-based system to record daily and monthly vehicle inspections. This system was introduced when the Police Service managed a small vehicle fleet and it is no longer fit for purpose.

2.4 During interviews with officers at the ten stations we visited, we were told that the requirements of the Standing Orders and other approved amendments are adequately communicated to all officers by their respective supervisors. We also found that officers had a clear understanding of the process and the system requirements for using a police vehicle and for the care and maintenance of the vehicle. We were informed that police supervisors shared information with staff on a daily basis, reminding them of all relevant areas of the Standing Orders, Departmental Orders and other amendments as they related to work activities including vehicle requirements. In addition, we were advised that most Divisions hold lectures at least once a month to disseminate relevant information to officers. However, our examination revealed major weaknesses in the Police Service's adherence to Standing Order 49.

2.5 The Second Division Officer in charge of a station is also responsible, in accordance with Standing Order 49:13 (c) to:

- (i) inform the Officer in Charge of the Division/Branch/Section of any defects, damages or missing items discovered;

- (ii) arrange with the Officer in Charge of the Vehicles Repair Centre to have such defects repaired, and
- (iii) institute an investigation where damages or missing items are discovered and submit findings and recommendations to the Officer in Charge of the Division within ten days of discovery.

2.6 At all stations visited we found that weekly status reports are prepared and submitted to Heads of Divisions. These reports provide information on the pool of vehicles within the station's portfolio such as, registration number, make, location and the condition of the vehicles (i.e whether working or not working). Evidence of arrangements made with the repair centres were limited to the notes on the status report that stated that the vehicle was at VMCOTT or other repair provider.

2.7 Standing Order 49:14 addresses drivers of police vehicles and instructs them to check the vehicle on assumption and completion of a 'tour of duty' in accordance with the '*Vehicle Check Requirements*' and to report any damages, defects or missing parts. The Standing Order was silent on the form of this reporting. We found that 'Inspection Check Sheets' were developed and used by three out of the ten stations visited. These sheets, marked 'In' and 'Out' provided written evidence that the daily vehicle checks were conducted. Although in many instances officers verbally indicated that the Standing Orders were being followed and that vehicle checks were done, the reports on vehicle checks were not produced.

2.8 Standing Order 49:13 (a) and (b) instructs the Second Division Officer in charge of a station to inspect the vehicle(s), for which he is responsible, at least once per week and to record the findings of the inspection in the Station Diary. In 90 per cent of the stations visited, we found that weekly checking was not conducted by the Second Division Officers. The officers indicated that they relied on the information supplied to them by the Officer in Charge of the vehicles.

2.9 Standing Order 49:12 requires that Heads of Division, Branch or Section carry out a monthly inspection of each vehicle and submit the findings on the '*Vehicle Inspection Report*'. At all Divisions visited, we were informed that monthly inspections were performed as required. However, we found very little evidence of this as records were poorly maintained. For example, in some instances the monthly inspection reports were seen in files for only two or three months of the year. As a result the files provided inadequate information on vehicles used by the stations.

2.10 Currently, the Police Service Standing Orders do not provide the necessary guidelines for all aspects of vehicle fleet management. Two important areas not covered are: vehicle purchase/lease and vehicle disposal. The only aspect of acquisition addressed is in Standing Order No. 49:8. This Standing Order gives responsibility to the Transport Branch to '*make recommendations on the acquiring of vehicles for the Police Service*'. During the course of our review we received two draft documents entitled "Procurement" and "Procedures to be initiated to facilitate the disposal of police vehicles". We were informed that the two documents were prepared by the Transport Branch for approval by senior officials. Currently, the Standing Orders do not provide guidance or procedures for making recommendations that relate to

purchase of vehicles. There are no Standing Orders for other internal processes such as ordering and receiving vehicles purchased.

2.11 Standing Orders 49:7 and 49:8 give the Transport Branch the following responsibilities:

- General operations of the vehicle repair centres including equipment, tools and the personnel attached thereto, and
- Formulation of policies for the efficient management and control of the vehicle repair centres.

These responsibilities are relevant to past operations when the Motor Pools provided the repair and maintenance service for the entire Police Service. In 2001, with the introduction of VMCOTT as the repair and maintenance provider, the Motor Pools no longer performed repair and maintenance work. The maintenance workers, such as mechanics and electricians, were subsequently deployed to various Divisions to perform the functions of Vehicle Maintenance Officers (VMOs). In other instances, persons were assigned as “Officers in charge of vehicles.” This meant that the Transport Branch officials were no longer required to supervise the work of the VMOs or these other officers. Although the activities of the Transport Branch had changed, the Standing Order instructions were not adjusted to accommodate these changes. Further, VMCOTT is an independent repair and maintenance company under the responsibility of the Ministry of Works and Transport. It is not under the control of the Police Service Transport Branch.

There was no standard management policy for selecting repair and maintenance service providers.

2.12 The Government recognized that the repair and maintenance of the increasing vehicle fleet was a challenge for the Police Service. As a result, during the years 2001 to 2004 the Government contracted VMCOTT to provide other vehicle services, such as purchase and lease of vehicles. In light of these contracts to provide the additional activities, VMCOTT proposed that its strategic direction change from that of a maintenance company to a fleet management company for the Police Service. However, we did not see that any decision was taken to engage VMCOTT as fleet managers of the Police Service, although contracts to purchase vehicles on behalf of the Police Service continued until 2008.

2.13 The service agreement with VMCOTT is for vehicles no longer under suppliers’ warranty and includes the supply and installation of vehicle parts and tyres. We found from our review of maintenance expenditure, that the Transport Branch continued to purchase parts, materials and vehicle supplies, including tyres, which are held in the ‘Stores’ of the Police Service. Officers of the Transport Branch stated that these items were purchased and held in the event that they are needed for repairs and cannot be supplied by VMCOTT. We also found evidence that the Transport Branch has supplied VMCOTT with tyres for replacement on police vehicles.

2.14 The Police Service recognized that there were problems in respect of their service arrangements with VMCOTT. In order to maintain some control of the repair and maintenance service provided and related expenditure, the Transport Branch implemented the following procedure in 2008: A police officer is stationed at VMCOTT's compound and is expected to supervise the maintenance and repair jobs submitted; approve additional repair jobs which cost up to \$25,000 and certify completed jobs. We found evidence that jobs were certified and approved by the police officer.

2.15 The Police Service had an inconsistent approach to maintenance of its vehicle fleet. We found that the agreements to provide maintenance services changed over the years as new arrangements attempted to address weaknesses of prior year agreements. We found that, in 2006, vehicle purchase details included the payment in advance of \$2.6 million for two years' maintenance services for 185 vehicles under a three-year supplier warranty. (See **Figure 8.**) A supplier's invoice would only be submitted when additional services, not in the agreement, were required.

Figure 8 Vehicle Maintenance paid for in advance				
Supplier	No of Vehicles	Type of Vehicles	Two year cost (per vehicle) (\$)	Total (\$)
A	37	Double Cab Pick-Up	15,575	576,275
B	4	Sedan	15,612	62,448
C	94	Four-Wheel Drive	14,221	1,336,774
D	6	Four-Wheel Drive	15,972	95,832
E	35	Sedan	12,000	420,000
F	9	Sedan	18,100	162,900
Total	185			2,654,229

2.16 We were informed that during the two years covered by the advance payments, the Police Service had difficulty managing the contractual requirements. A key failure was the non-adherence to the warranty maintenance schedule. Police vehicles not sent for service at the allotted time resulted in the loss of the prepayments.

2.17 In 2007 the Police Service adopted a 'pay as you need' arrangement where the service would be provided prior to payment. We were informed that due to late payment practices by the Police Service, many private suppliers have refused to continue providing service.

Adequate guidance is not provided in Standing Orders for monitoring Repair Centres.

2.18 Standing Order 49:8(e) specifically states that the officer in charge of the Transport Branch must visit repair centres to ascertain whether the instructions given for the efficient management of the centre have been adhered to and, if not, take necessary action to ensure compliance. The repair centres referred to in the Standing Order were the Police Service Motor Pools. We saw no documented evidence of instructions given by the officer in charge of the Transport Branch or of actions to be taken or actually taken to ensure compliance.

2.19 Standing Order 49:16(1) requires that Second Division Officers in charge of a “Divisional Workshop Repair Centre” submit a monthly return to the First Division Officer in charge of the Transport Branch in a format specified, showing:

- Type of repair done on each vehicle, and
- The cost of such repairs.

Evidence of the completion of the monthly return was not seen at the Motor Pools visited neither at the Transport Branch. It was not clear whether the instruction is still an expectation of the Motor Pools as “Divisional Workshop Repair Centres” no longer exists.

2.20 We were informed that instructions to the Motor Pools were given verbally but not documented. We were unable to assess whether the activities performed at the Motor Pools were due to specific managerial instructions or to the initiative of the staff. We found that the records maintained at the two Motor Pools visited differed. The South Motor Pool maintains a record of the number of jobs undertaken on a daily, monthly and annual basis. A similar record was not produced by the Port of Spain Motor Pool. At the South Motor Pool, duplicate job sheets from 2009 January to May were seen stored in folders awaiting input to the computer system. We were informed that the system was ‘down’ and awaiting repairs.

2.21 We found that Job Sheets were prepared by both Motor Pools to facilitate repairs and included brief descriptions of the extent of the vehicle repairs needed. However, the cost of relevant repairs was not identified or specified. The Motor Pools made arrangements for all vehicle repairs whether with VMCOTT or with other private entities.

2.22 During our review we found that as at 2007 December 31, 490 vehicles representing 45 per cent of the fleet were not in working condition. In spite of this large number of vehicles needing repairs, there was no evidence of an equivalent number of damage or defect reports on vehicle files. There is a Police Service expectation that the Motor Pools ensure that defect reports are submitted and filed.

Recommendations

2.23 The Police Service should assess the reasons why officers do not follow the guidelines provided by the Standing Orders. Where instructions are burdensome, unrealistic, out-dated and no longer meet the needs of the increased vehicle fleet, a review is necessary. An example is the non-completion of the ‘*Vehicle Check Requirements*’ to record the daily inspection of the vehicle before and after each tour of duty. Inherent in police work is the necessity for urgent responses. Adequate measures should be taken to improve and speed the process, since completing detailed forms may not be practical each time an officer has to use the vehicle. Each station should have Vehicle Maintenance Officers with responsibility to check vehicles on a daily basis before handing the vehicles over to officers on duty who should be required to sign on receipt.

2.24 The management of the Police Service should establish a comprehensive fleet management system without delay to inform decision-making prior to any further increases in the fleet. The system should support documentation and approval of the policies and procedures for acquisition, replacement, use, maintenance and disposal of the vehicles. The system should include monitoring at all levels especially by Heads of the Divisions and Officers in Charge of Stations to ensure proper compliance with the policies and procedures. Documented strategies would ensure ownership and understanding by all users and continuity by current and subsequent managers.

2.25 The paper-based system currently in use by the Police Service should be reviewed and urgent consideration should be given to the use of a networked computerized fleet management system. This system could include vehicle tracking, driver management, vehicle diagnostics, vehicle maintenance, fuel and speed management and health and safety tracking¹.

¹ Extracted from article by John Mahoney on “Fleet Management – A Must Have Tool for Business”
Management and Maintenance of Vehicles in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service

PART THREE

STRATEGIES TO ENSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF POLICE VEHICLES NEED TO BE REVIEWED

The Police Service approach to purchasing vehicles has been inconsistent.

3.1 The Police Service does not have a comprehensive documented policy on fleet management. During the past 12 years, the Police Service has seen many changes in the senior personnel responsible for Fleet Management as shown in **Figure 9**:

Figure 9 Police Service Vehicle Fleet Management	
Year	Fleet Management Arrangement
1996 to 2000	A fleet manager was employed.
2001	VMCOTT was engaged to provide vehicle maintenance services.
2002 to 2004	A new fleet manager was employed.
2004 to 2008 March	The Police Service operated without a certified fleet manager. To continue with vehicle operations an uncertified officer of the Transport and Communication Branch was given the responsibility for managing the fleet.
2008 April	A civilian was contracted and given responsibilities which included vehicle fleet management.

3.2 The combination of frequent changes in managers and the non-existence of a comprehensive policy resulted in the acquisition of a wide variety of vehicles, for example, 18 different types of cars and six different types of vans and jeeps. Purchasing decisions were based on the preference of the manager in charge at the time and this was further exacerbated by the Police Service's failure to implement a policy. VMCOTT, the main supplier of maintenance services, was concerned that the wide variety of vehicles has had a negative impact on the efficiency of repairs. It has led to delays because of the difficulty in obtaining or sourcing parts and storing those that are available. The Police Service in recognizing the inefficiencies that have occurred as a result of the frequent turnover of fleet managers is now utilizing civilian fleet management skills and knowledge as part of its transformation process.

3.3 We found that Police Service strategies are impacting on the demand for police vehicles and fleet management, for example, the Police Service has invested in a pilot project resulting in the creation of nine 'Model' Police Stations. The aim of the project is to provide a more

customer-focussed Police Service. This involved adjusting the internal infrastructure of the stations to better address the needs of the Police Service customers. The Police Service has determined that the ideal resource requirement for each Model Station is 100 officers and ten vehicles. Model stations became effective from 2007. We have not seen any report on an assessment of the effectiveness of this strategy and on the impact on the other 61 stations following the transfer of resources.

Purchasing decisions are a challenge for the Police Service.

3.4 The Transport Branch, through Standing Order 49:8 can ‘*make recommendations on the acquiring of vehicles for the Police Service*’. In 2003, at a meeting of Divisional Heads and other senior officials, decisions were made with respect to vehicle acquisition. A list referred to as a ‘Needs Analysis’ was produced stating the type and quantity of vehicles that were required for the various Divisions and Stations. The rationale followed by the Transport Branch has not been updated since 2003. We found that over the past five years up to and including 2008, the Police Service has relied upon the recommendations of the 2003 ‘Needs Analysis’ for vehicle acquisitions. Despite this approach, the Police Service has been collecting data on the vehicle needs of Divisions and Units annually, although they are not making purchase decisions based on the current needs.

3.5 The lack of a current needs analysis to determine the comprehensive Police Service vehicle requirements prior to purchase, impacts on the delivery of an efficient and effective service to the public and could result in excessive and unjustifiable expenditure.

3.6 Our review of financial documents for the financial years 2006 to 2008 revealed that 497 vehicles were purchased for \$86.4 million in these years. (Figure 10 refers.) The Recurrent Expenditure was made from the Police Service account and the Development Programme Expenditure was made from funds allocated to the Project Management Unit of the Ministry of National Security.

Figure 10 Vehicle Expenditure for years 2006 - 2008						
Year	Location	Recurrent Expenditure		Development Programme Expenditure		Total Expenditure (TT\$)
		No. of Vehicles purchased	Actual Cost (TT\$)	No. of Vehicles purchased	Actual Cost (TT\$)	
2006	Trinidad	12	2,195,221	166	22,922,256	25,117,477
2007	Trinidad	57	10,803,952	29	3,639,642	
2007	Tobago	13	2,290,285	-	-	16,733,879
2008	Trinidad	220	44,585,170	-	-	44,585,170
Total		302	59,874,628	195	26,561,898	86,436,526

3.7 We found that \$41.85 million was spent in 2006 and 2007 to acquire 277 vehicles and \$44.5 million was spent in 2008 to acquire 220 vehicles. The individual cost of vehicles in 2008 increased by 34 per cent over the previous years from \$151,305 to \$202,659 per vehicle. The increased cost can be attributed to the 2008 Police Service purchase focus on Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) and Double Cab Pick-ups for all Divisions, Branches and Units. In the absence of a Police Service strategy for the vehicles purchased, there is no evidence as to the vehicles fitness for purpose or rationale for the excessive cost increases.

Purchase of vehicles involved a number of organizations which resulted in an inefficient process.

3.8 The process for acquiring vehicles is a shared responsibility which involves not only the Police Service but also the Ministry of National Security, the Central Tenders Board and VMCOTT. The Accounting Units of these agencies (with the exception of the Central Tenders Board) make the payments to the suppliers and maintain purchase records. The Ministry of National Security has overall responsibility for the vehicle purchases.

3.9 The Ministry of National Security receives its mandate for operations from the State which includes receiving funding to provide the Police Service with vehicles. The Project Management Unit of the Ministry purchased 195 vehicles at a cost of \$26.6 million under its Development Programme expenditure over the three-year period to 2008, to increase the size of the Police Service fleet. The Police Service purchased 302 vehicles at a cost of \$59.8 million over the same period from its Recurrent Vote for the ‘replacement’ of vehicles in the fleet. (See **Figure 10.**)

3.10 During the course of our review, the Project Management Unit was unable to provide the vouchers for 146 vehicles acquired in 2006. Due to the inability of the Project Management Unit to supply the requisite vouchers, information on the acquisition was extracted from the Vote Book. This weakness is amplified in that our review further revealed that photocopies of the same Central Tenders Board approvals were used by both the Police Service Accounting Unit and the Project Management Unit to effect payment for purchases. Lack of communication between the two Units and the above major weakness in internal control resulted in a duplicate payment for two vehicles. (**Figure 11 refers.**) We were informed that the Police Service has begun an investigation into the matter.

Figure 11	Police Service Vehicle Duplicate Payment
	Two Hilux vehicles purchased for the Police Service at a cost of \$118,583 each were paid for twice.
	The Police Service Accounting Unit paid \$237,166 for two vehicles in 2007 April.
	The Project Management Unit of the Ministry of National Security paid for the same two vehicles in 2007 September. Both payment vouchers included the same two Hilux vehicles as evidenced by the same registration number, engine number and chassis number.

3.11 The Transport Branch receives all vehicles from the suppliers and is expected to maintain vehicle records for those received. However, we found that the vehicle records of the Transport Branch were not properly maintained. Vehicle files provided limited information as only initial acquisition data is recorded, such as: type of vehicle, year of purchase, registration details and posting location. Essential information such as the cost, maintenance schedule and vehicle general life history was not included. Limited computerized information included cost budgets, a master vehicle list to 2007 and some administrative documents.

3.12 We found that all vehicle purchases by the Project Management Unit of the Ministry and the Police Service are subject to the tendering procedures of the Central Tenders Board. The Central Tenders Board evaluates tenders from all suppliers for the vehicles and makes awards. Award letters to suppliers were seen for the relevant purchases. This is a control procedure set up by the State to ensure that all large sums to be expended are properly authorized and approved.

3.13 We also found that the Ministry engaged the services of VMCOTT to purchase vehicles on behalf of the Police Service. These acquisitions were more costly for the Police Service than purchases made directly from the suppliers. The extra cost was due to the payment of a procurement fee of three per cent of the list price to VMCOTT and 15 per cent Value Added Tax (VAT) on the procurement fee. For example, the overall cost of a batch of 100 vehicles purchased in 2008 was \$19,516,339 of which \$650,859 represented the procurement fee. Vehicle purchases by VMCOTT do not require the approval of the Central Tenders Board.

Recommendations

3.14 The Police Service should ensure that a procurement policy is established, approved and documented as a matter of urgency. The strategy should place an expectation that procurement of vehicles is geared towards obtaining the highest possible quality at the lowest possible price that forms a best fit in delivering an effective and efficient service to the public.

3.15 A key element of a well-managed vehicle fleet is the need to determine, on an annual basis, the appropriate type and quantity of vehicles required. The Police Service should ensure that vehicle needs are properly considered by Divisional Heads in collaboration with users at each Station and Unit. Each request must have adequate justification for vehicle type and quantity that fits with the overarching Police Service strategy. Information collected should be analyzed in accordance with appropriate guidelines developed.

3.16 Regular monthly reviews should be undertaken to identify vehicles underutilized and allow for reassignment of those vehicles to Divisions, Stations or Units with greater need.

3.17 There should be greater communication between the Transport Branch of the Police Service and the Project Management Unit of the Ministry of National Security with respect to the acquisition of vehicles for the Police Service.

Leasing and Renting of vehicles are not well managed.

3.18 In addition to purchases, the Police Service leases and rents vehicles. The Police Service rented vehicles on a continuous basis for the period 2006 to 2008 for use by several Units falling under the responsibility of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime and Operations and the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Criminal Intelligence.

3.19 We were informed that records such as rental agreements and weekly status reports were maintained by these Units. Our review was based on the records maintained by Crime and Operations. There is no documented Police Service policy on vehicle rental. We were informed that one Unit was given overall responsibility for vehicle rentals for the Crime and Operations Division which included:

- Granting Approvals/Justifications
- Sourcing of supplies
- Certifying invoices for vehicles
- Rentals
- Maintaining rental records
- Preparing weekly status reports, and
- Weekly inspection.

We found that approximately 65 vehicles per month were rented during the period 2007 December to 2009 February.

3.20 We were not provided with any information from the Criminal Intelligence Unit. As a result we were unable to ascertain the number of vehicles rented by this Unit.

3.21 There was no evidence of a formalized or documented system in place to manage the rental of vehicles. Vehicles were rented as and when required and on a continuous basis. There was no evidence that the rental of vehicles was coordinated at a management level. We found no documented guidelines for contract negotiations or for the selection of suppliers. Information on rentals was not maintained in a manner that enabled the number of vehicles rented each year or the cost of vehicles per Unit to be easily identified. The responsibility for rental of vehicles and maintaining rental records was not part of the portfolio of the Transport Branch. These systemic weaknesses in the management of leased and rented vehicles have led to administrative problems (See example at **Figure 12**) and potentially life-threatening failures. For example, during the course of our review, we were informed that rental of vehicles is a confidential facility used to enable covert operations. In keeping with the nature of covert operations, there is a Police Service expectation that vehicles should not be kept for periods exceeding three months, with the exception of vehicle rentals in Tobago. Despite this, we found that 16 vehicles were rented for a period of 14 continuous months.

Figure 12 The Ministry of National Security and the Police Service face difficulties in the management of leased vehicles.

We found that the Ministry of National Security leased 100 vehicles in 1996 from the National Insurance Property Development Company Limited (NIPDEC) for use by the Police Service.


The lease agreement for 60 out of the 100 vehicles was for a period of 36 months to 1999 at a monthly rental of \$183,214.69 of which \$168,964.69 represented rental and \$14,250.00 was for repair and maintenance expenditure. The Police Service failed to make timely payments to NIPDEC over the period. In 2005 May, the Ministry was informed that an amount of \$788,422.56 was still owing to NIPDEC. This was evidenced by a payment of \$428,108.34 made in 2006 November for a sum invoiced by NIPDEC in 1999 September.

A further complication occurred in 2005, when NIPDEC informed the Ministry that several of the leased vehicles were 'apparently sold' by the Police Service without having legal title to the vehicles.

The above examples highlight the administrative and management difficulties that are faced by the Ministry of National Security and the Police Service in the lease and rental of vehicles without a well thought-out strategy.

3.22 Expenditure for rental of vehicles was extracted from the recurrent expenditure records maintained by the Police Service Accounting Unit. Expenditure for the financial years 2005/2006, 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 shows that rental costs continued to increase over the three years. In 2006/2007, the actual expenditure exceeded the estimated budget by more than 80 per cent. (See **Figure 13**.)

Figure 13 Expenditure on rental of vehicles



3.23 We saw no evidence that the Police Service evaluated the cost and service delivery benefits derived from leasing/renting versus purchasing of vehicles. For example, we found that some of the vehicle rentals were on a continuous long-term basis. The long-term arrangements with as many as 20 different suppliers brought no cost-benefit to the Police Service. The rates charged were the same as the going market rate to the average citizen. The Police Service did not take advantage of opportunities to negotiate a ‘good deal’ that should achieve favourable rental terms. We found evidence of inconsistent application of administrative procedures in that not all vouchers were supported by the relevant vehicle agreements. Rental agreements were not seen in 73% of the sample examined.

3.24 The Police Service has failed to pay suppliers promptly. The Police Service was unable to provide reasons for these delays. The delays reflect systematic poor management of the funds relating to the lease and rental of vehicles. We found from our sample of 117 payment vouchers that there were several instances where late payments exceeded one year. For example, a request for approval for payment of \$48,266 to be made to a supplier for rental over the seven-month period 2006 January to July included a statement that the supplier had threatened to seize the vehicle. Further examples of lengthy periods between invoicing and payment are shown in **Figure 14** below.

Figure 14 Late Lease/Rental Payments in respect of five amounts invoiced for the sum of \$278,000 in 2005/2006		
Invoice Date	Date Passed for Payment	Elapsed Period (months)
2005/09/01	2007/03/01	18
2005/10/01	2007/03/01	17
2005/11/01	2007/03/01	16
2006/01/01	2007/03/01	14
2006/02/01	2007/03/01	13

3.25 During the course of our audit, we found that vouchers were paid based on letters from suppliers which did not have invoice numbers quoted. Several credit notes each for a sum of \$699.99 were seen among invoices submitted for rental payment. The Police Service Accounting Unit was unable to provide us with explanations for these Credit Notes. Additionally, payment controls were found to be weak as demonstrated by the following:

- Photocopies of invoices were used to effect payments;
- Cheque numbers were not recorded on payment vouchers, and
- Documented rental agreements were not made available.

The Police Service does not have a policy or strategy for the disposal of vehicles.

3.26 We were provided with a document prepared by the Transport Branch in 2008 that detailed the disposal process followed. The procedures include identifying the vehicles to be disposed of and obtaining the necessary external approvals through to the collection of revenue. The approval process followed the normal Public Service procedures for disposal which includes obtaining the prior approval of the Comptroller of Accounts and the Central Tenders Board. The Transport Branch identifies the vehicles to be disposed of and makes the necessary recommendations. After this, the Comptroller of Accounts is requested to conduct a ‘Board of Survey’ to verify the condition of the vehicles before giving approval for their disposal. We reviewed the list of disposals approved by the Commissioner of Police and found that the disposal procedures were correctly followed for disposals approved in 2008.

3.27 The decisions by the Police Service to replace and dispose of vehicles appear to be based on the complete breakdown or non-functioning of vehicles. Records showing basic information on the historic life, repair and maintenance that could inform disposal decisions are not maintained. The Police Service does not analyze the costs associated with depreciation and wear and tear of vehicles to enable appropriate disposal arrangements.

3.28 The lack of Police Service policy to guide and inform the disposal of vehicles results in inconsistent decisions. For example, in 2008 the vehicles disposed of were those considered either non-road-worthy or very costly to repair. In early 2009, vehicles in poor condition and requiring complete overhaul were sent to VMCOTT for ‘restoration’. VMCOTT reported that in many instances vehicles are “towed in” because of the severity of the repairs needed. The Police Service does not give sufficient priority to the value for money of some repairs, whether due to age or vehicle failure/damage. **Figure 15** shows the cost of repairing aged vehicles.

Figure 15 Cost of repairing aged vehicles	
Type and age of vehicle	Cost of repair (TT\$)
SUV - two years old	26,898
SUV - four years old	44,915
Van - six years old	60,711

3.29 We found that 205 vehicles were disposed of in the financial year 2008, earning revenue of \$3,112,000 from which \$31,120 was deducted as commission. The revenue was deposited at the Comptroller of Accounts, as required. The number of vehicles disposed of and the disposal revenue earned are shown in **Figure 16** below.

Figure 16 Revenue collected from vehicles auctioned in 2008		
Date	No. of vehicles auctioned	Revenue (TT\$) (excluding commission)
2008/10/23	48	764,478
2008/10/30	64	482,823
2008/11/07	66	1,752,795
2008/11/13	27	80,784
Total	205	3,080,880

3.30 Vehicles are identified for disposal on a periodic basis. There appears to be a lengthy time lag between identification and actual disposal. During this time the vehicles are stored at the Transport Branch compound. The vehicles awaiting disposal are considered derelicts and become an environmental and health hazard. The Police Service has not recognized that the vehicles, in continuing to deteriorate, inevitably lose value and auction revenue. For example, ten of the vehicles identified for disposal during 2008 were not sold as planned. Those not sold in 2008 were removed and stored at the Port of Spain compound of VMCOTT.

Recommendations

3.31 In order to ensure that availability of vehicles is kept at an adequate level to deliver an effective service, the Police Service should have a policy for determining the best time to replace or dispose of vehicles. The main criteria for disposal should include vehicle mileage, age, condition and increasing maintenance cost.

3.32 The Fleet Manager should place urgent and immediate emphasis on maintaining records which track each vehicle's life cycle, a fundamental asset management requirement. The maintenance of accurate and complete records will enable better informed decisions to be made on the optimal time to replace a vehicle.

3.33 The Police Service should establish policies and procedures for the lease/rental of vehicles and ensure strict adherence thereto.

PART FOUR

THE POLICE SERVICE MAINTENANCE STRATEGIES WERE WEAK

Operations at the Motor Pools.

4.1 There are three Motor Pools which are located in Port of Spain, San Fernando and Tobago respectively. We visited the Motor Pools in Port of Spain and San Fernando. We were informed that vehicles in need of repair in south Trinidad are brought in to San Fernando Motor Pool and those in other parts of the country are taken to the Port of Spain Motor Pool. Officers at the Motor Pools review the vehicles and determine the level of the repair work required. Where repairs at the San Fernando Motor Pool are basic they are performed by the Motor Pool staff. At this Motor Pool repair work up to a maximum of \$25,000 can be approved by the officers stationed there. In Port of Spain, repairs are handled by VMCOTT. The Transport Branch (Head Office) approves all jobs above \$25,000 and these jobs fall within the remit of VMCOTT.

4.2 There is an imbalance in the responsibilities of the Vehicle Maintenance Officers (VMOs) that reflects ineffective overall management and lack of management information leading to uncertainty around workload. We found that:

- two VMOs are responsible for approximately 34 vehicles at nine stations within the North Eastern Division;
- three VMOs are responsible for approximately 56 vehicles at six stations and one Police Post within the Port of Spain Division;
- two officers are responsible for 13 vehicles at the E 999 Unit;
- one VMO is responsible for 52 vehicles at ten stations and two Police Posts within the Southern Division, and
- one VMO is responsible for 36 vehicles at ten stations within the South Western Division.

4.3 We found that vehicle records are not properly maintained by the VMOs. During our interviews with the VMOs, we were informed that they needed assistance to perform the basic administrative requirements. They reported that they have difficulty maintaining files and preparing reports on the vehicles.

4.4 Standing Order No. 49(7) and 49(8) states that the officer in charge of the Transport Branch shall, inter alia:

- Be responsible for the general operations of the vehicle repair centres including equipment/tools and the personnel attached thereto;
- Formulate policies for the efficient management and control of the vehicle repair centres;
- Open and maintain files to include history, posting, purchase documents, estimates of repairs and any other relevant information pertaining to the vehicle; and
- Communicate vehicle information to the Administration Branch, Divisions, Sections and Units.

We found that these instructions were not strictly complied with.

4.5 During our review, we found that the Transport Branch takes possession of all vehicles on purchase and maintains a vehicle Master List. However, we found that the records provided inconsistent information. The Master List held information for vehicles owned from 1995 to 2007 such as: year of purchase, registration number, make, model, type, current working condition and location. However, the information regarding vehicles purchased in 2008 was recorded separately and listed the registration number, type and location. Prior to 2008 the Master List was prepared using the Police Service Versadex II software, which was subsequently discontinued in favour of an Access database.

4.6 A sample of 91 vehicle files was requested at the Transport Branch for review to assess compliance with the requirements of Standing Order 49:8(f) in relation to the opening and maintenance of files on vehicles. Twenty-six vehicle files representing 29 per cent of those requested were not produced.

4.7 The Police Service opened files for vehicles received at the Transport Branch. However, the files were neither properly maintained nor properly secured. The files were found stored in boxes and in cabinets without locks. Current records with information relating to vehicles were not filed. We found the following discrepancies:

- Vehicle files were not properly maintained in that:
 - information on the files was not up to date and generally related to 2005;
 - documents were neither bound nor carried folio numbers in 50 per cent of the files, and
 - files were not stored securely and in a manner which facilitated ease of retrieval.
- Information in files was incomplete in that of the 65 files presented:
 - 86 per cent had no Inspection Reports;
 - 26 per cent did not contain the Certified Copy of Ownership for the vehicle;
 - 85 per cent had no Job Sheets, and
 - 8 per cent had no Vehicle History Cards.
- Information was not current in that:
 - 14 per cent of Inspection Reports related to the years 2000 to 2005;
 - Job Sheets reflected repair work requested in periods prior to and including 2005.

Further, information on dates the vehicles were sent for repairs and returned was not recorded.

4.8 At the San Fernando Motor Pool we found that vehicle files were not maintained for each vehicle but repair and maintenance records including Job Sheets were maintained. (See **Figure 17.**)

Figure 17

Operations at the San Fernando Motor Pool



Operations at the San Fernando Motor Pool

At the San Fernando Motor Pool very minor vehicle repair services are provided by the two police officers employed. The officers coordinated the repair work required for vehicles assigned to the Southern and Central Divisions.

This includes:

- arranging wrecking services for vehicles that could not be driven to VMCOTT;
- visiting vehicles at various locations to assess damages;
- issuing fuel at the Motor Pool on a daily basis, and
- preparing Job Sheets and maintaining all vehicle repair records.

We reviewed the vehicle records maintained and we found that the duplicate Job Sheets were properly completed and signed but filing was not up to date. We were informed that original Job Sheets were sent with the vehicle to the service provider. Duplicate Job Sheets for the period 2009 January to May had not yet been filed.

The computer records could not be examined at the time of our visit because the computer system was “down”. A further complication is that there is no staff allocated to assist with filing and entering of computer data.

Police records could not confirm complaints against their main service provider.

4.9 We were informed by the Transport Branch and other police officers that VMCOTT takes a long time to complete repair jobs. However, little evidence was observed in the documents scrutinized. We analyzed VMCOTT’s 2009 January payment claim to obtain evidence for the time taken to complete requested work. We found that of the 131 jobs in the 2009 January payment claim, 122 jobs took an average of one to three days, i.e. 90 per cent of jobs requested were completed within one to three days. Only eight took more than two weeks to complete (See **Figure 18.**) We noted that the majority of jobs related to simple mechanical procedures such as: changing tyres, tyre repair, battery and light replacement.

Part Four

Figure 18 Repair jobs completed by VMCOTT in 2009 January

	Repair requested as per Job Sheet	Date sent	Date Completed	Time Taken (Working days)
1	Service brakes, radiator, steering, front door glass, and Air Conditioning	2008/10/21	2009/01/29	69
2	Check air conditioning, brakes, front shocks, replace shock bearing and mounts.	2009/01/12	2009/01/29	14

Figure 18 Repair jobs completed by VMCOTT in 2009 January				cont'd
	Repair requested as per Job Sheet	Date sent	Date Completed	Time Taken (Working days)
3	Service engine, change oil, filter, plugs, Check Starter and Clutch Cable	2008/11/26	2009/01/29	44
4	Check and install Drive Belt, repair Air Conditioning, check front suspension	2008/12/18	2009/01/29	28
5	Electrical Problem	2008/12/16	2009/01/27	28
6	Brakes	2008/10/30	2009/01/29	62
7	Check brakes, suspension and fuel gauge	2009/01/05	2009/01/29	19
8	Change right & left cradle bushing	2009/01/06	2009/01/29	18

IT software is not being used to manage the vehicle fleet effectively.

4.10 In 2001, the Police Service purchased Versadex IT software to provide assistance in crime fighting such as recording fingerprints and other crime information. We were informed that the capabilities of the software were extended to include a fleet management module in 2007 October. However, the Transport Branch indicated that the system was not suitable as it did not provide full fleet management information. In addition, we were advised that on the introduction of the Versadex fleet management module, training was not included as part of the extended package. This lack of training resulted in many available and useful applications being underutilized and vital management information in the form of reports and analyses not being produced.

4.11 An additional failing is that the Transport Branch computer system is not networked to link the external Divisions, Stations and Administration. The Fleet Manager is based at a separate location from the Transport Branch, which is also distant from the Accounting Unit and these factors have resulted in financial information on vehicles not being easily accessible to the Transport Branch. Despite investment in and access to suitable IT, the reports submitted by Divisions and Stations to the Transport Branch continue to be paper-based.

4.12 Due to the lack of Police Service IT investment and training policies and little demand for suitable management information, the Transport Branch faces a challenge in coordinating and ensuring the effective use of the computerized system to maintain complete vehicle records.

Vehicle maintenance expenditure increased but adequate records were not available to assess whether value for money was achieved for maintenance services.

4.13 The cost of maintenance for the Police Service vehicles was \$28 million in the financial year 2006. This sum fell by 11 per cent to \$25 million in the financial year 2007 and increased by 8 per cent to \$27 million in the financial year 2008. These costs are recorded under the Recurrent Expenditure and include a combination of actual and committed costs for the relevant years. (See **Figure 19**.) The maintenance expenditure was on items such as batteries, tyres, fuel, washing vehicles and repairs.

Figure 19 Expenditure and Commitments for the Maintenance of Vehicles			
Financial Year Ended	Actual Expenditure (TT\$)	Outstanding Commitment (TT\$)	Total (TT\$)
2006	25,825,803	1,748,353	27,574,156
2007	21,193,136	3,673,429	24,866,565
2008	25,671,709	1,324,831	26,996,540

4.14 Despite the above payments the maintenance provider VMCOTT has reported in 2008 December that a large balance of approximately \$18 million remains due from the Police Service for work done from 2001 to 2008. VMCOTT has also stated that the long delays in the payment of bills by the Police Service causes cash flow problems for the company. The Police Service is currently attempting to manage this issue.

4.15 VMCOTT cannot refuse to perform the repair and maintenance service for the Police Service as the company is mandated by the Government to provide these services. VMCOTT explained that there is no direct contract with the Police Service and no provision for breaches by the Police Service. For example, arrangements are made with the Police Service to bring vehicles for repair and maintenance. If however, payments are not made on time, VMCOTT cannot take action to enforce payment.

4.16 VMCOTT evaluates vehicles brought in for repair in the presence of the resident police officer and together they agree on whether or not additional work (not submitted on the Job Sheet) is required. Where differences are noted, a costing is prepared and approved by the police officer if the sum is within his delegated level of authority. The police officer also assesses quality assurance and test-drives completed work to confirm the road-worthiness of the vehicles. VMCOTT's employees are not authorized to road-test police vehicles.

4.17 VMCOTT confirmed that the delay in completing some jobs resulted mainly from the company's inability to obtain necessary vehicle parts. VMCOTT has difficulty stocking and even accessing parts for the 24 different types of vehicles in the Police Service fleet. In addition, some parts were difficult to obtain due to the model and age of the vehicle. Delays in some instances were due to the time taken to import the parts.

4.18 We were also informed that the Transport Branch approves all maintenance and repair work which costs over \$25,000 and that the approval for those jobs must be received by VMCOTT before the work can begin. VMCOTT has stated that the time taken for this approval process is often lengthy. We reviewed status reports of VMCOTT for six days within the period 2008 July to 2009 February and noted that the time taken for VMCOTT to receive approval from the Police Service Transport Branch to proceed with repair jobs, varied from one month to fifteen months. (**Figure 20** refers.)

Figure 20 Time taken by the Police Service to provide approval for repairs to VMCOTT			
Date Booked	Repair Work	Approval date	Time taken (Months)
2008/06/16	Turbo	2008/07/16	1
2008/03/14	Alternator	2008/07/16	4
2008/05/20	Knock in engine	2009/04/30	11
2008/01/21	Purchase or rebuild engine	2009/04/30	15
2008/03/28	Gears not engaging	2008/11/27	8
2008/05/29	Knock in engine	2009/04/30	11
2008/04/23	Purchase or rebuild engine	2009/04/30	12
2008/09/05	Engine	2008/11/27	2
2009/03/13	Knock in engine	2009/04/30	1
2008/12/17	Transmission	2009/02/16	2
2009/02/17	Knock in engine	2009/04/30	2
2008/12/17	Transmission	2009/04/30	4
2009/02/17	Transmission	2009/04/30	2
2009/03/16	Transmission	2009/04/30	1
2009/02/05	Transmission	2009/04/30	2
2008/10/14	Engine	2009/04/30	6
2008/12/08	Gear Box	2009/04/30	4
2008/09/30	Gear Box	2009/04/30	7
2008/10/31	Engine	2009/04/30	6
2008/10/23	Transmission	2009/04/30	6
2008/10/31	Engine	2009/04/30	6

4.19 VMCOTT has attempted to implement preventive maintenance for police vehicles by identifying vehicles to be brought in for service on a scheduled monthly basis. The system failed due to the non-compliance by the Police who did not bring in the vehicles according to the prescribed dates. As a result the system failed completely in early 2008.

Recommendations

4.20 The aim of a dependable maintenance programme is to keep vehicles functioning effectively and at the lowest maintenance cost. The Police Service should ensure that the strategy must consider all operating cost and any additional cost to the State when the vehicle is not available for use. While there may be no one standard maintenance guide that will cover all vehicles, preventive maintenance should be developed as it is key to avoiding repair or replacement of costly vehicle components.

4.21 The Police Service should ensure that the Motor Pool staff are competent to effect simple repairs such as changing tyres, tyre repairs, battery and light replacement to obviate the need for these simple mechanical procedures to be carried out by VMCOTT.

4.22 Permanent records should be maintained which provide information on each vehicle, such as: Daily maintenance logs, Fuel usage logs, and Cumulative cost of parts, Labour, and Overheads.

The Police Service should ensure that the Divisions and Stations have an adequate number of vehicles.

4.23 During our review we found that 24 police stations within various Divisions operated with only one vehicle. In light of this the response to public requests would be weak. We noted however that the specialized unit attached to the station had its own vehicle.

4.24 We found that the availability of vehicles for use by stations is affected by the working condition of the vehicles. The work performance of the Police Service is affected by the number of vehicles not working at particular points in time. During our review of a sample extracted from six Divisions and four Units we found that in 2008 August, only 260 vehicles were available for use out of 492 vehicles assigned. (**Figure 21** refers.) The Northern and Eastern Divisions had below 50 percent vehicle availability, while three other Divisions, namely Central, Port of Spain and Southern had between 51 to 56 per cent availability. Two vehicles were assigned to the Community Police Unit, one of which was not working and the other was to be disposed of resulting in the section having to operate without a vehicle. In addition, the Court and Process Unit is required to operate with 33 per cent of its 12 vehicles. These figures indicate that the Police Service is failing to use strategies to ensure that the rate of availability of its fleet is maintained at acceptable levels.

4.25 We noted that one key operational area, the E 999 Command Centre had 70 per cent availability which is relatively good. We found that this was due to adequate resource planning by the Command Centre managers. The Centre has two vehicle officers with dedicated responsibility for its 20 vehicles. Review of the records revealed that vehicles were duly checked every morning and evening by these officers and appropriate action taken for repairs and other maintenance. We noted also that the Planning and Development Unit of the Police Service, part of the Administrative Arm, had 71 per cent of its 14 vehicles available. This could be due to the non-aggressive type of activities performed by the officers of this Division.

Figure 21 The Status of Police Vehicles at 6 Divisions and 4 Units					
Divisions and Units	Vehicles Posted (No.)	Vehicles not Working (No.)	Vehicles for disposal	Vehicles available	Percentage of Vehicles available
Central Division	90	22	22	46	51%
Community Police	2	1	1	0	-
Court and Process	12	5	3	4	33%
E-999 Command	20	0	6	14	70%
Eastern Division	53	18	10	25	47%
North Eastern Division	50	12	7	31	62%
Northern Division	94	26	25	43	46%
Port of Spain Division	53	14	10	29	55%
Southern Division	104	27	19	58	56%
Planning & Development	14	4	0	10	71%
Total	492	129	103	260	

Source: Extract of the 2008 August 'Status Report for the Year' of the Transport Branch.

4.26 During our examination we gathered further evidence of the unavailability of vehicles to the Police Service by reviewing the records of the key repair and maintenance provider, VMCOTT. We found that at least for one day of seven different months, varying numbers of vehicles are not available for use by the Police Service because the vehicles are down for repair work. (See **Figure 22.**) The numbers below did not include vehicles sent to other repair providers and those unavailable for other reasons such as, servicing and disposal. The Police Service must decide what rates of unavailability are acceptable for its fleet size and aim for the least possible rate.

Figure 22 Police vehicles unavailable for use due to repair		
Day unavailable *	Vehicles under repairs (No.) *	Percentage of fleet of 1,058
2008/07/16	105	10 %
2008/11/ 27	86	8 %
2008/09/30	87	8 %
2008/12/30	159	15 %
2009/01/29	98	9%
2009/02/16	129	12 %
2009/04/30	116	11%

Source: * VMCOTT Daily Status Report

The lack of trained drivers hinders effective service delivery.

4.27 All Stations have a complement of drivers assigned to every shift. Assignment of drivers is based on the number of vehicles at the station and the sanctioned strength of officers at the Station or Unit. Some Divisional Heads stated that the number of Police Officers with permission to drive is insufficient to provide adequate response to public requests. Of the 14 Stations and Units visited, six stations had one driver assigned to a shift, four stations had two drivers and one special unit had five drivers.

4.28 We were informed that officers are given training in defensive driving for short periods after which they can apply for the permission of the Commissioner to drive a police vehicle. We were also informed that becoming a driver is optional and officers can refuse to continue as drivers. Senior officers stated that some vehicle problems such as transmission breakdown were directly related to some drivers being acquainted only with automatic vehicles and not those with a manual gear-shift. Vehicle problems such as transmission breakdown shows the failure of the Police Service to provide adequate and timely training for drivers to meet their needs.

Recommendations

4.29 The Police Service should make strategic decisions for the management and maintenance of its fleet of vehicles. The decision must be specific as to the area of responsibility of the Police Service as fleet managers and VMCOTT as the repair and maintenance provider.

4.30 Clear policies should be established for each area of responsibility and adequate human and physical resources should be provided to ensure timely performance and the monitoring of the performance.

4.31 The IT system should be able to capture and analyze adequate vehicle information for all Divisions, Branches, Stations and Units so that decisions can be made on acceptable vehicle availability rates for the Police Service.

4.32 The Police Service must make every effort to ensure adequate availability of vehicles to all Divisions and Units which deal with the public. Valuable lessons can be learnt from a Unit such as E-999 Command Centre, which shows positive vehicle availability. The reasons for the unavailability must be recorded so that proper analysis and decisions can be made as to what are acceptable availability rates for a relevant fleet size.

PART FIVE

AGENCY'S COMMENTS

1. By letter dated 2009 October 09, the draft Report of the Auditor General of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago on a "Special Audit of the Management and Maintenance of Vehicles in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service" was forwarded to the Acting Commissioner of Police for information and review.
2. By letter dated 2010 January 28 a response was received, some extracts of which are reproduced hereunder.

Extracts from "Review and Comments of Special Audit of the Fleet Management and Maintenance of Vehicles in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service by the Auditor General's Department of Trinidad and Tobago"

"The report submitted by the Auditor General's Department was reviewed. This document reflects the comments by the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) on the observations and findings of the audit as well as the recommendations of the report.

"The report identifies many areas where there is a lack of proper management of the TTPS Fleet and these (*sic*) negatively on the mobility of the Police Service. However, there are two (2) major decisions that have been made that are aimed at improving management capability within the TTPS as well as the mobility of the TTPS.

"The first decision relates to the Transformation of the TTPS. This involves the recruitment of Civilian Heads to manage various Departments. This would allow Police Officers to return to Policing Duties and also offer professional support to the Commissioner of Police. A Fleet manager is to be hired and would report to the Head Administration.

"The second decision relates directly to Fleet Management in the TTPS. The Cabinet of Trinidad and Tobago has made a decision that The Vehicle Management Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago (VMCOTT) is to provide complete Fleet Management Services to the TTPS. VMCOTT would therefore own the Vehicles and the TTPS would then lease the vehicles from VMCOTT.

"The comments are categorized based on the findings of the report. The major issues are listed as follows:"

...

"1. Transformation of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS)

The TTPS is currently undergoing a Transformation Process. This involves an increase in management capabilities within the service with the objective of addressing issues as those highlighted throughout the report...."

“2. Fleet Management Philosophy of the TTPS and role of The Vehicle Management Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago (VMCOTT)

... in December 2009 the Minister of National Security wrote to the Commissioner of Police indicating that the Cabinet of Trinidad and Tobago had made a decision that VMCOTT would provide COMPLETE FLEET MANAGEMENT SERVICES TO THE TTPS.

...

VMCOTT has sent a report to the Minister of Public Administration with their recommended plan for this transition arrangement. The Minister is to take a note to Cabinet for Approval. The Minister of Public Administration was the chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Committee that was responsible for this decision.”

“3. Selection of Vehicles

The report identified the numerous makes/models of vehicles purchased. This was identified in A Standing Committee which was formed with the responsibility for the selection of vehicles by a Departmental Order. The Head Administration is the Chairman of this committee and is to make recommendations to the Commissioner of Police. The committee is to determine the number of vehicles required throughout the TTPS and ensure ‘fit for purpose’ vehicles are procured....”

“4. IT Software not used Effectively to Manage Fleet

...

The TTPS IT Department will also be liaising with VMCOTT to determine the needs of the TTPS as part of the new Fleet Management Philosophy.”

“5. Standing Orders

... The Standing Orders would be updated and created to reflect the new Fleet Management Policy of the TTPS....”

“6. Procurement Policy

... The TTPS is also reviewing its Procurement Policy to ensure it addresses the new management structure and philosophy....”

“7. Disposal of Vehicles

...

“The new Fleet Management Policy will address this issue.”

“8. Leasing/rental of Vehicles

...

The process will be reviewed and documented accordingly.”

“9. Payment to Suppliers

A Head Finance is one of the outstanding positions to be filled. This unit will also undergo a transformation and reorganization with a review of the systems and procedures.”

METHODOLOGY

Audit officers used a variety of methods during the course of their examination of the management and maintenance of police vehicles as follows:

A. Document review

Relevant files and other documents were scrutinized in an attempt to assess whether the Police Service had policies for the efficient management and control of its fleet of vehicles. This method was also used to check whether action taken to ensure compliance to policies and procedures was documented. In addition, the method helped to assess how vehicles were acquired for use by the Police Service and the type of records maintained to provide reliable information.

B. Data Collection

Data was collected from officers at the Transport Branch, the main section responsible for the management of police vehicles. The data provided covered the number of vehicles owned, posted and disposed of over the last three years. Financial data was also gathered from the accounting units which provided the cost of acquiring and maintaining police vehicles. Data was also collected from the main repair service provider VMCOTT.

C. Observation and file review

In order to gain an understanding of the management and maintenance of vehicles at the various Police Divisions and Stations, the audit examination included visits to a sample of fourteen stations/units as follows:

- ✓ San Fernando Police Administration (Divisional Headquarters)
- ✓ San Fernando Model Station
- ✓ Princes Town Police Station
- ✓ West End Model Station
- ✓ St. James Police Station (Divisional Headquarters)
- ✓ Chaguanas Model Station (Divisional Headquarters)
- ✓ Cunupia Police Station
- ✓ Morvant Model Station (Divisional Headquarters)
- ✓ San Juan Police Station
- ✓ Belmont Police Station (Divisional Headquarters)
- ✓ Woodbrook Police Station
- ✓ E-999 Headquarters
- ✓ Siparia Police Station
- ✓ Penal Police Station
- ✓ Sangre Grande Police Station.

Stations in the Northern and Tobago Divisions were not part of the sample visited. During our visits informal interviews were held with key personnel which included senior officers and officers directly responsible for the vehicles. At some stations vehicles were physically scrutinized to assess their existence and their condition. Vehicle files were also scrutinized to assess whether they were properly maintained with relevant and up-to-date information.

D. Interviews with Senior Management and the repair provider

Senior management personnel both administrative (civilian) and police officials were interviewed to gain an understanding of management's view of the current status and strategies for the police vehicles. Semi-structured interviews were also held with senior personnel of The Vehicle Management Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago Limited (VMCOTT), the main police vehicle maintenance provider, to ascertain their view of the working relationship between their organization and the Police Service as a client.